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Abstract: The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)
setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product
collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively.
This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg
(MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the
manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve
product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW
are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is
always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if
the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in
the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government
organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not
necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives
a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening
level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and
add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully
among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the
manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally
and economically viable outcome.
Keywords: production planning optimization; closed-loop green supply chain; government subsidy;
stackelberg game; re-manufacturing
1. Introduction
In last two decades, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is gaining increasing attention from
both industry practitioners and academics due to alleged benefits for sustainable development
and growing environmental awareness among consumers and environmental regulations [1–7].
Government organizations play an impressive role in the development of sustainable product
manufacturing and re-manufacturing decisions; they can enforce strict legislation, as well as offer
support through various subsidy policies. In Japan, the Ministry of Environment approved 5 billion
yen in 2019 as a subsidy for the manufacturer to cover 33% to 50% of their equipment price to
produce products with biodegradable bio-plastics (https://bioplasticsnews.com/2018/08/27/japan-
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government-bioplastics/). The government of China provides a subsidy in different ways. For example,
a manufacturer in Hunan province receives a one-time subsidy to improve re-manufacturing activities,
whereas in Hubei province, Sevalo Construction Machinery Re-manufacturing Co. Ltd. receives 1
million RMB as a research and development (R&D) subsidy to improve re-manufacturing activities [8].
In 2016, the Chinese government introduced the “Guidance on Promoting Green Consumption”
program to achieve the long-term goal of stimulating green product consumption. Through the
Technology & Quality Up-gradation Support scheme for MSMEs (TEQUP), the government of India
provides a subsidy up to 25% of the project cost for implementation of energy efficient technology.
The support became one of the key factors influencing growth for the companies like Banyan
Nation, Karma Recycling; in fact, the former company received the Dell People’s choice award
for circular economy entrepreneur at the world economic forum in Davos (www.standupmitra.in/
Home/SubsidySchemesForAll). To encourage the consumer to procure an energy-efficient green
vehicle, the United States government provides subsidies up to $7500 for the purchase of a plug-in
electric vehicle [9]. Government organizations in the USA, such as The Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), has awarded a total of $1.24 million in recycling market development grant money to
upgrade and install new equipment to increase the amount of recyclables (www.recyclingtoday.com/
article/ohio-epa-recycling-grants/). The European Union also put significant efforts to promote green
product manufacturing and expedite product reuse, as well as introduce various financial packages to
encourage the circular economy (European Commission, 2015). Recently, an innovative and flexible
pan-European network of research funding organizations, supported by EU Horizon 2020, proposed
a funding of 14.530 million euros (www.era-min.eu/sites/default/files/docs/call_text_2018_0.pdf).
The above evidences explain that government subsidy policies are made in different ways.
Therefore, it is imperative to conduct comparative analysis for highlighting the pros and cons
among those policies. Despite the necessity to explore the effect of different government subsidy
policies in CLSCs under government social welfare (SW) maximization objective, comparative
study is relatively sparse. This study considers omnipotence of three subsidy policies under the
manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS) games to pinpoint their effects and
explores the answers to the following research issues:
1. How does the government social welfare optimization goal affect the optimal decision of a
CLSC members?
2. Do power structures and product type affect the used product collection, pricing, and investment
decision of the product?
3. Which policy stimulates the manufacturer to escalate investment in R&D and product
collection activity?
4. What are the main barriers associated with each subsidy policy that overturn the government,
as well as CLSC members’ sustainability target?
In an attempt to answer the above questions and provide insights, we examined outcomes of eight
scenarios and compared corresponding optimal decisions. For tractability, and in line with the CLSC
configuration considered by previous studies [10], we mainly focused on single period optimal decision.
However, product collection and network design [11] is an important aspect, we limited this study on
the manufacturer collection mode only to keep our focus on the assessment of three subsidy policies
under a three-stage game framework. In Policy C, the government provides a subsidy directly to the
consumer [12] to stimulate a green product purchase. In Policy RE, the government shares a fraction
of manufacturer investment effort to encourage used product return. In Policy T, the manufacturer
receives a fraction of R&D investment from the government as a subsidy to improve the greening
level (GL) [13]. To compare outcomes of subsidy policies, we derived an optimal decision under no
subsidy as the benchmark, called Policy N. To explore the influence of a powerful retailer, models were
formulated under both the MS and RS game frameworks; and results are compared. This study
contributes to the present literature as follows: First, comparative analysis will help practitioners to
understand the behavior of pricing, investment decision for the manufacturer in used product return,
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and R&D to improve GL in a CLSC. Second, the government sets the SW optimization goal and decides
the amount of the subsidy. Therefore, results can provide a guideline for them before implementing
subsidy policies. Third, according to the investment decision, green products can be categorized
as development intensive green products (DIGPs); marginal cost-intensive green products (MIGPs);
and marginal-development cost-intensive green products (MDIGPs) [14,15]. Examples belonging
to the first categories are developing LED bulbs; integrating an adaptive product business model,
energy star home appliances, technology for product-life extension, and high-speed electric cars.
All of these require a substantial amount of R&D investments. On the other hand, there is installing
lithium-ion car batteries or emission control devices, using biodegradable plastics for FMCG packaging,
and the manufacturing cost increasing with per unit product, all of which belong to second category.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the effect of MDIGPs on CLSCs has not been explored yet.
Therefore, this study provides a complete overview for the manufacturer on the investment decision
to produce MDIGPs. Finally, comparative study in the perspective of participating members can
assist to formulate a framework to design a subsidy policy for green product manufacturing and
re-manufacturing.
This study is organized as follows. The following subsection a brief literature review is reported to
highlight the position of our research in the literature. Assumptions and background of the models are
presented in Section 2. CLSC decisions under subsidy policies are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4,
managerial insights are drawn with numerical illustration. Finally, conclusions, limitations, and future
research are presented in Section 5.
1.1. Literature Review
It is imperative for CLSC members trading with green product to consider the evolving behavior
of consumers when making important strategic and operational decisions. Possibly, Ottman [16]
first reported the opportunities and the pitfalls in green marketing. The author noted double benefit
for the consumer, i.e., ‘personal benefit’ and ‘environmental benefit’, in green product procurement.
Since then, numerous studies related to green supply chain (GSC) management explored the properties
of optimal decision under price-GL sensitive demand in different perspectives [17–19]. We will discuss
some recent works focusing on variation of optimal decisions in different games under price-GL
sensitive demand. Ghosh and Shah [20] compared optimal decisions obtained for different games
and stated that the GL increased in the MS game, but the consumers needs to pay more. Liu and
Yi [21] established that pricing and GL changes considerably under various power structures when the
manufacturer also invest in knowing consumer preference information in the big data environment,
and the manufacturer needs to set the lowest wholesale price under the RS game. Yang and Xiao
[22] explored optimal decisions for a GSC under governmental interventions and used triangular
fuzzy numbers to describe the imprecise information. The authors found that RS game scenario is
the best for all players if governmental interventions are strong enough. Nielsen et al. [23] explored
characteristics of the three-level GSC in a two-period setting. The authors found that the manufacturer
needs to trade with the product at lower GL if the distributor dominates the GSC. Chen et al. [24]
examined pricing, along with the investment effort of both the manufacturer and retailer in a GSC.
The authors found that the total GSC profits increased if members share the R&D expenditure but not
individual of the manufacturer or retailer simultaneously. Dey et al. [14] found that the manufacturer’s
decision to produce MIGPs and DIGPs is highly sensitive to the power structure. The authors found
that a powerful retailer might want to trade with MIGPs, which leads to less amount of profit for the
manufacturer. In this direction, the recent works of Huang et al. [25] and Ranjan and Jha [26] are worthy
of mention. The findings of the above cited articles support that the game structures always made an
impact on the optimal decisions. However, the above studies explored the characteristics of a forward
SC. We extended this stream of research and studied the properties of CLSC under price-GL sensitive
demand. CLSC is one of the great interests in both business and academic researchers due to growing
consumer awareness on environmental issues and regulations. In existing literature, CLSC models
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are studied to explore various perspectives. For example, Hong and Yeh [27], Ma et al. [28], and Saha
et al. [29] compared optimal decisions in a CLSC under different collection mode. The authors
formulated their models mainly under the MS game framework and explored the consequences
where the manufacturer, retailer, or a third party, individually or jointly collects used products. On
the other hand, CLSC coordination issues were comprehensively studied by Zhang and Ren [30],
He et al. [31], and others. For example, Hong et al. [32], Johari and Motlagh [33], and He et al. [31]
discussed effect of two-part tariff contract; Zhao et al. [34] used a commission fee contract, while a
revenue-and-expense sharing contract is used by Xie et al. [35], and spanning revenue-cost sharing is
used by Choi et al. [36]. On the other hand, the optimal decision under different game structures is
discussed by Wang et al. [37], Gao et al. [38], Zheng et al. [39], and others. In those studies, the authors
made an effort to highlight how the optimal decision changes according to game structure. We refer to
recent review articles [2,40–42] on CLSC for detailed discussion. The environmental and operational
measures of a CLSC network is another important aspect, where how to reduce number of vehicles to
be used and the resulting carbon emissions, as well as the impact of re-manufacturing on environment,
are studied extensively under an integer programming framework. We refer to the work by [43–45]
for the detailed discussion in this direction. However, as mentioned earlier, it is difficult to ignore the
influence of government organizations on the optimal decision in a CLSC, but literature is scanty in
that direction. Zhang et al. [46] measured the supply-chain green efficiency (SCGE) of thirty-seven
different industrial sectors in China and found that environmental policy management and innovation
capacity of the manufacturer are important factors affecting SCGE. Researchers mostly explored the
influence of a government subsidy in a forward SC. For example, Hafezalkotob [47], in addition to
Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki [12], explored the optimal decision where the consumer receives a subsidy
directly from the government; Chen et al. [48] explored characteristics of optimal decisions when both
the manufacturer and retailer receive a subsidy on per unit product; Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki [49]
discussed the optimal decision for a two-echelon SC when the manufacturer receives a subsidy on the
R&D investment. To establish the position of the present study, we outline existing work on CLSCs
under influence of a subsidy in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of existing studies with the present study. SW = social welfare; GL = greening
level; MS = manufacturer-Stackelberg; RS = retailer-Stackelberg.
Study Games Effect Nature of Subsidy SW
of GL Maximization
Mitra and Webster [50] MS No To the manufacturer to increase re-manufacturing
activity
No
Ma et al. [51] MS No To consumers to procure new products No
Shu et al. [52] MS No To the manufacturer for re-manufacturing No
Xiao et al. [53] MS No To the manufacturer and consumer jointly Yes
Heydari et al. [54] MS No To the manufacturer and retailer for re-manufacturing No
Jena et al. [55] MS No Replacement subsidy to the customer and
manufacturer
Yes
Jena et al. [56] MS No To the manufacturer for re-manufacturing No
Guo et al. [3] MS No To the manufacturer for re-manufacturing No
Wan and Hong [57] MS No To the manufacturer for re-manufacturing and retailer
for recycling
No
Saha et al. [58] MS No To the manufacturer and to consumer based on the
greening level
No
He et al. [59] MS No Directly to consumers Yes
Present study MS and
RS
Yes Directly to consumers, to the manufacturer for
improving quality and to the manufacturer for
re-manufacturing
Yes
Table 1 demonstrates that most of the articles focused on the behavior of participants under a
single subsidy policy, mostly under the MS game setting. The effect of joint influence of price-GL
is also ignored. With growing awareness about green products, the influence of GL needs to be
considered to obtain a pragmatic CLSC decision. Comparative study to explore preferences of the
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CLSC members, consumers, and government organizations are not examined in the previous literature.
In this study, the investment and pricing decisions of a CLSC members are explored by correlating the
optimal decision of the government organization. This study can help practitioners to understand the
pricing and investment patterns for the manufacturer under the MS and RS games in a CLSC setting.
Comparative analysis conducted in this study on the efficiency of investment and consumer preference
can help government organizations to cultivate a pragmatic subsidy policy.
2. Prerequisites and Assumptions
We considered eight different scenarios, namely Scenarios ij, i ∈ {m, r}, which signifies MS and
RS games; j ∈ {C, RE, T, N}, which refers to the models where consumers receive a subsidy (C),
the manufacturer receives a subsidy on the investment effort on recycling (RE), and the manufacturer
receives a subsidy on the total R&D investment (T); and the benchmark decision model where the
government organizations do not provide a subsidy (N), respectively. Therefore, the first index
represents the game structure, and the second one represents the subsidy policy. The following
notations presented in Table 2 are used to differentiate the decision and auxiliary variables in different
scenarios:
Table 2. Decision and auxiliary variables.
wji wholesale price of the new/re-manufacturing product
pji market price
τ
j
i collection rate of used products
θ
j
i greening level
ρ
j
i per unit subsidy received by the consumer from the government, (ρ
j
i < p
j
i)
η
j
i subsidy received by the manufacturer on investment to improve recycling, (0 ≤ η
j
i ≤ 1)
µ
j
i fraction of subsidy received by the manufacturer on investment to improve GL, (0 ≤ µ
j
i ≤ 1)
π
j
ki member k’s profit, k ∈ {m, r}
π
j
gi SW of government
Qji sales volume
The following assumptions are made to establish proposed models:
1. Similar to Nielsen et al. [60]; Dey et al. [14]; Dey and Saha [61], the market demand is
linearly dependent on the retail price and GL, and its functional form is Dji = a − p
j
i + βθ
j
i ,
where a represents potential intrinsic demand, and β(> 0) represents GL sensitivity. Therefore,
higher value for a means the consumer has the better perception about the product. For analytical
simplicity, the coefficient of price sensitivity is normalized with the unit [15].
2. It is assumed that re-manufacturing cost is less compared to manufacturing cost, i.e., cr < cm
[6,57]. The manufacturer invests CL(τ ji , α) = ατ
j
i D
j
i + κτ
j
i
2
to collect used products, where κ > 0
represents the scaling parameter, and $α > 0 represents the monetary benefit’s for the consumers
for returning used products. If α = 0, this assumption is similar to Ma et al. [28], Xiao et al. [53],
and Wan and Hong [57]. τ ji represents the collection rate (0 ≤ τ
j
i ≤ 1). While optimizing objective
functions, all members have access to the same information [51,59]. A portion δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) of the
collected used products converts into new one [57].
3. The manufacturer bears extra cost for green technology innovation. In a recent study by Zhang
et al. [62], it was found that technological innovation have significant effects on regional
industrial eco-efficiency. In this study, we assume that the manufacturer produces MDIGPs,
and corresponding per unit and total R&D investment costs are considered as λ1θ and λ2θ2,
respectively. Therefore, λ1 and λ2 represents the efficiency of the manufacturer on per unit
investment and investment in R&D, respectively. If λ1 = 0, then the manufacturer invests in
producing DIGPs [18,19]. If λ2 = 0, then the product converts to MIGPs [63]. The fixed cost for the
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retailer and manufacturer are normalized to zero [14,15]. The government organizations provide
a R&D subsidy on the total investment. As noted by Dey et al. [14], for MIGPs, the variable cost
is directly proportional with the product quality, and it might not possible to recover the cost for
the manufacturers. For example, installing emission reduction devices or packaging material are
directly proportional to the unit product, but it is difficult for the manufacturer to recover the cost
of those in the re-manufacturing process.
4. The influence of three subsidy policies was analyzed. In Policy C, the government provides a
subsidy ρji on per unit product directly to consumers. Therefore, the consumers need to pay p
j
i − ρ
j
i
[12,64] for per unit purchase. In Policy RE, the manufacturer receives a subsidy η ji , (0 < η
j
i ≤ 1) on
the investment effort on used product collection. In Policy T, the manufacturer receives a subsidy
µ
j
i , (0 < µ
j
i ≤ 1) on the R&D investment [13,65] to improve GL.
5. We find optimal decisions in a three-stage game to study the influence of government decision.
Under the MS and RS games, the decision sequence is defined as follows:
• Step 1: The government decides the subsidy rate (ρCi or η
RE
i or µ
T
i ) by maximizing social
welfare;
• Step 2: In the MS game, the manufacturer decides wjm, θ
j
m, and τ
j
m. In the RS game, the retailer
decides the profit margin mjr = p
j
r − w
j
r;
• Step 3: In the MS game, the retailer decides the retail price pjm. In the RS game,
the manufacturer decides wjr, θ
j
r, and τ
j
r .
Therefore, the government takes the responses of the CLSC members into consideration,
while deciding the subsidy rate [48,59].
3. The Models
In this section, we formulate mathematical models to examine the characteristics of optimal
pricing, re-manufacturing, and investment in R&D for CLSC members and the subsidy rate of
government organizations. The scenarios wherein the consumer subsidy is provided are explored
in Section 3.1, and then the scenarios where the manufacturer receives a subsidy on the investment
effort for improving used product collection are discussed in Section 3.2, and finally, the equilibrium
results are derived in Section 3.3, where the manufacturer receives a subsidy on the R&D investment.
Optimal decisions between the MS and RS games are compared to explore characteristics of GL,
collection rate, SW, and the government subsidy rate.
3.1. Optimal Decisions in Policy C
The manufacturer produces MDIGPs and sells to the retailer at wholesale price wCi . The retailer
sells those to the customers at a price of pCi . The demand function in Policy C is D
C
i = a− (p
C
i −
ρCi ) + βθ
C
i . The manufacturer collects used product directly from the consumers for re-manufacturing.
The government organization decides the subsidy rate by maximizing SW. A consumer subsidy on
electronic vehicles is common in countries like China, Canada, Germany, Japan, etc. [66]. The profit
functions for the retailer and manufacturer, and the SW for the government in Scenarios MC and RC
are obtained as follows:
πCri(p
C
i ) = (p
C
i − w
C
i )D
C
i , (1)
πCmi(w
C
i , θ
C
i , τ
C
i ) = (w
C
i − λ1θ
C
i )D
C
i + (cmδ− α− cr)τ
C
i D
C
i − κτ
C
i
2 − λ2θCi
2
, (2)
πCgi(ρ
C
i ) = π
C
ri + π
C
mi +
DCi
2
2
− ρCi D
C
i . (3)
The government’s objective function includes the influence of profits for each member, the social
aspect, i.e., consumer surplus (CS), and the total amount of the subsidy provided by the government
organization [67,68]. The CS is the area of the demand curve below a given price, which can be
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expressed as D
C
i
2
2 . Optimal decisions in Policy C under the MS and RS games are presented in
Lemma 1,2, respectively. The detail derivations of optimal decisions are presented in Appendix A,B,
respectively. Additional notations used throughout the study are presented at the end of Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Optimal decision in Scenario MC are obtained as follows:
ρCm =
6(a−cm)κλ2
∆1
; wCm =
(aN2−2cmκ)λ2−YZκ
∆1
; pCm =
(aN3−4cmκ)λ2−YZκ
∆1
; θCm =
(a−cm)κZ
∆1
; τCm =
(a−cm)Xλ2
∆1
;
πCmm =
(a−cm)2κλ2(M1κ+N3λ2)
∆12
; πCrm =
4(a−cm)2κ2λ22
∆12
; πCgm =
(a−cm)2κλ2
∆1
; QTm =
2(a−cm)κλ2
∆1
, where ∆1 =
M1κ − X2λ2.
Lemma 2. Optimal decision in Scenario RC are obtained as follows:
ρCr =
(a−cm)κ(M1κ+N2λ2)
∆1
; wCr =
aN1λ2+YZκ
∆1
; pCr =
(a−cm)M1κ−cm N1λ2+YZκ
∆1
; θCr =
(a−cm)Zκ
∆1
; τCr =
(a−cm)Xλ2
∆1
; πCmr =
(a−cm)2κλ2(2κλ2+∆1)
∆12
; πCrr =
2(a−cm)2κλ2(2κλ2+∆1)
∆12
; πCgr =
(a−cm)2κλ2)
∆1
; QCm =
2(a−cm)κλ2
∆1
.
The concavity of profit functions for CLSC members and SW for the government in Scenarios
MC and RC is ensured by condition ∆1 > 0 and 4κ > X2, respectively. It is found that feasible values
of GLs (θCm and θCr ) of the product exists if β > λ1. Therefore, if per unit investment efficiency for the
manufacturer is too low, but consumer sensitivity with green product is less, then the manufacturer
cannot produce MDIGPs. The unit cost of the product increased with λ1; in this circumstance,
the manufacturer cannot compensate increasing cost. Therefore, results make sense. By comparing
optimal decisions between the MS and RS games, the following theorem is proposed.
Theorem 1. In Policy C
1. The greening levels, collection rates, and social welfare are identical under both games; and the amount of
the subsidy on per unit product is higher under the MS game.
2. The greening levels, collection rates, subsidy rates, and social welfare decrease with respect to λ1 and λ2.
We refer to Appendix C for the details of Theorem 1. Lemma 1,2 indicate that if the manufacturer is
not efficient enough, then it is difficult to produce greener product. Per unit subsidy and the collection
rate decreases with respect to λ1 and λ2, and as a result, SW decreased. Additionally, the manufacturer
needs to reduce the total investment effort in improving used product collection if the manufacturing
cost is high. Therefore, results are sensible. Except profits of CLSC members, game structures do
no have any effect on the optimal decision. The manufacturer charges a higher wholesale price,
and the retailer sets a higher retail price in the MS game because wCm − wCr =
2(a−cm)κλ2
∆1
> 0 and
pCm − pCr =
(a−cm)(κ(β−λ1)2+X2λ2)
∆1
> 0, respectively. Due to more bargaining power, the subsidy rate is
always higher in the MS game, but the consumer needs to pay the same price under the MS and RS
games because (pCm− ρCm)− (pCr − ρCr ) = 0. Overall, consumers remain unaffected, and the government
needs to provide a higher per unit subsidy under the MS game, which does not ensure higher quality.
3.2. Optimal Decisions in Policy RE
The profit structure of CLSC members and the SW of government remain similar to the
previous subsection, but the demand function converts to DREi = a − pREi + βθREi . For example,
in China, manufacturers and government organizations, such as China’s National Development
and Reform Commission in 2010, collaborated to promote the program “Comments on Boosting
the Re-manufacturing Development” to encourage product reuse [52]. As discussed in Section 3.1,
the profit functions for the retailer and manufacturer, and SW in Scenarios MRE and RRE are obtained
as follows:
πREri (p
RE
i ) = (p
RE
i − wREi )DREi , (4)
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πREmi (w
RE
i , θ
RE
i , τ
RE
i ) = (w
RE
i − λ1θREi + XτREi )DREi − (1− ηREi )κτREi
2 − λθREi
2
, (5)
πREgi (η
RE
i ) = π
RE
ri + π
RE
mi +
DREi
2
2
− κηREi τREi
2
. (6)
Derivations of optimal decisions are similar to Policy C, hence omitted. The concavity of profit
functions for CLSC members and SW for the government in Scenarios MRE and RRE is ensured by
condition ∆2m > 0 and ∆2r > 0, respectively. Optimal decisions under the MS and RS games are
presented in Lemma 3,4, respectively.
Lemma 3. Optimal decision in Scenario MRE are obtained as follows:
ηREm =
6λ2
M4
; wREm =
(a(4M3κ−M4X2)+4cm M3κ)λ2
∆2m
; pREm =
4(8(3a+cm)κ−7aX2)λ22−2Z2(a(6κ−X2)+2cmκ)λ2+2M3YZκ
∆2m
;
θREm =
(a−cm)M3Zκ
∆2m
; τREm =
(a−cm)M4Xλ2
∆2m
; πREmm =
(a−cm)2 M3κλ2
∆2m
; πRErm =
4(a−cm)2 M3κ2λ22
∆2m2
; πREgm =
(a−cm)2 M4κλ2
∆2m
; QREm =
2(a−cm)M4κλ2
∆2m
, where ∆2m = M32κ −M4X2λ2.
Lemma 4. Optimal decision in Scenario RRE are obtained as follows:
ηREr =
N3λ2−Z2κ
2κ(M2+λ2)
; wREr =
M2(2(a+cm)(κ−X2)λ2+(cm M2+YZ)κ)+X2(cm M2+YZ)λ2
2∆2r
; pREr =
κZ3((a−cm)β−2Y)+Z((a−cm)(2κZ+(4κ+X2)β)−2aN4Z)λ2+2(a(7N1−2X2)+cm(4κ+X2)λ22
2∆2r
; θREr =
(a−cm)Z(M2κ+X2λ2)
2∆2r
;
τREr =
(a−cm)Xλ2(M2+λ2)
∆2r
; πREmr =
(a−cm)2λ2(M2κ+X2λ2)
4∆2r
; πRErr =
(a−cm)2λ2(M2κ+X2λ2))
2∆2r
; πREgr =
(a−cm)2λ2((M1+M3+M2)κ+X2λ2)
4∆2r
; QREr =
(a−cm)λ2(M2κ+X2λ2)
∆2r
, where ∆2r = M22κ − X2(M2 + 2λ2)λ2.
Recall that optimal subsidy rates in Policy C are directly proportional with market potential,
and different results are obtained in Policy RE. Although the demand increases with market potential,
it does not directly affect the subsidy rate. However, the government may have to spend more because
the collection rates τREm and τREr , or overall demand QCm and QCr , increase with market potential.
The following theorem highlights the characteristics of the optimal decision.
Theorem 2. In Policy RE,
1. The greening levels, collection rate, and social welfare are always higher under the RS game: however,
the subsidy rate is higher under the MS game
2. The greening levels, collection rates, subsidy rates, and social welfare decrease with respect to λ1 and λ2.
We refer to Appendix D for the details of Theorem 2. The outcome of Theorem 2 differs from the
previous one. A powerful retailer can enforce that the manufacturer produce and trade with greener
product. The product collection rate is also higher under the RS game. Similar to Policy C, the subsidy
rate is higher under the MS game. Therefore, one can find an indication that the sustainability goal can
be achieved under the RS game in the presence of a subsidy.
3.3. Optimal Decisions in Policy T
In this subsection, models are formulated and the optimal decision is derived in Policy T.
A similar type of subsidy policy is discussed in the forward SC setting by several researchers [59].
For example, to strengthen sustainable innovation, $400 million was allotted to fund the R&D
of energy technologies as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [48].
The demand function in this policy becomes DTi = a − pTi + βθTi , and the corresponding profit
functions of the manufacturer and retailer; and SW remains similar with previous subsections,
and they are obtained as follows:
πTri(p
T
i ) = (p
T
i − wTi )DTi , (7)
πTmi(w
T
i , θ
T
i , τ
T
i ) = (w
T
i − λ1θTi )DTi + XτTi DTi − κτTi
2 − (1− µTi )λ2θTi
2
, (8)
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πTgi(µ
T
i ) = π
T
ri + π
T
mi +
DTi
2
2
− µTi λ2θTi
2
. (9)
Note that the manufacturer receives a subsidy on the total R&D investment, not on per unit
product λ1θTi , i = m, r. If λ1 = 0 and µ
T
i = 0, the profit functions become similar to Ghosh and
Saha [18], as well as Song and Gao [19], where the authors examined the optimal decision for a forward
SC setting where the government does not provide any subsidy. Similar to previous subsections,
we derive the optimal decision for Policy T and omit the detailed derivation. Lemma 5,6 characterize
the optimal decisions under the MS and RS games, respectively.
Lemma 5. Optimal decision in Scenario MT are obtained as follows:
µTm =
6κ
N5
; wTm =
N5YZκ+N4(aN2+4cmκ)λ2
∆3m
; pTm =
N5YZκ+N4(aN3+2cmκ)λ2
∆3m
; θTm =
(a−cm)N5Zκ
∆3m
; τTm =
(a−cm)N4Xλ2
∆3m
; πTmm =
(a−cm)2 N4κλ2
∆3m
; πTrm =
4(a−cm)2 N42κ2λ22
∆3m
; πTgm =
(a−cm)2 N5κλ2
∆3m
; QTm =
2(a−cm)N4κλ2
∆3m
,
where ∆3m = N42λ2 − N5Zκ.
Lemma 6. Optimal decision in Scenario RT are obtained as follows:
µTr =
N3λ2−Z2κ
2(N2+κ)λ2)
; wTr =
N2(aN1+cm N3)λ2+Zκ((aN1−cm(3N2+2κ))β+(aN4+cm N2)λ1)
2∆3r
; pTr =
N2((a+cm)κ+aN2)λ2−Zκ(a((Z+β)κ−N3λ1)+cm(N2β+κλ1)
∆3r
; θTr =
(a−cm)Zκ(N2+κ)
∆3r
; τTr =
(a−cm)X(N2λ2+Z2κ)
2∆3r
;
πTmr =
(a−cm)2κ(N2λ2+Z2κ)
4∆3r
; πTrr =
(a−cm)2κ(N2λ2+Z2κ)
2∆3r
; πTgr =
(a−cm)2κ((3N2+2κ)λ2+Z2κ)
4∆3r
;
QTr =
(a−cm)κ(N2λ2+Z2κ)
∆3r
, where ∆3r = N22λ2 − N3Z2κ.
The concavity of profit functions for CLSC members and SW in Scenarios MT and RT is ensured by
condition ∆3m > 0 and ∆3r > 0, respectively. Similar to Policy RE, optimal decisions differ according
to the power of CLSC members, and increasing market potential does not effect the subsidy rates.
By comparing optimal decisions, the following theorem is proposed.
Theorem 3. In Policy T
1. The greening level, collection rate, and social welfare are always higher under the RS game; however, the
subsidy rate is higher under the MS game.
2. The greening levels, collection rates, subsidy rates, and social welfare decreases with respect to λ1 and λ2.
We refer to Appendix E for the details of Theorem 3. Results of Theorem 2,3 are similar. Overall,
SW and GL are higher under the RS game under Policy RE and T. In all three policies, the subsidy
rates are higher under the MS game, but it does not guarantee the higher SW and GL. Therefore,
a shift of power from the manufacturer to the retailer in a CLSC always encourages in the perspective
of achieving the sustainability goal. By combining concavity conditions, one can conclude that the
profits of CLSC members and SW are concave in three subsidy policies under the MS and RS games if
M1 > 0, N1 > 0 and ∆1 > 0. To obtain an overview of increment or decrements in GL, used product
collection rate, profits of CLSC members, and SW, we derive the optimal decision in the absence of a
subsidy.
3.4. Optimal Decisions in Absence of Subsidy
By substituting ρji = 0, or η
j
i = 0, or µ
j
i = 0 in Equation (1),(2); (4),(5); (7),(8), respectively, one can
obtain the profit functions of CLSC members in the absence of a subsidy. The corresponding optimal
decisions under the MS and RS games are presented in Lemma 7,8, respectively.
Lemma 7. Optimal decision in the absence of a subsidy under the MS game is as follows:
wNm =
aN1λ2+(YZ+4cmλ2)κ
∆4m
; pNm =
aN3λ2+(YZ+2cmλ2)κ
∆4m
; θNm =
(a−cm)Zκ
∆4m
; τNm =
(a−cm)Xλ2
∆4m
; πNmm =
(a−cm)2κλ2
∆4m
;
πNrm =
4(a−cm)2κ2λ22
∆24m
; QNm =
2(a−cm)κλ2
∆4m
, where ∆4m = N4λ2 − κZ2.
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Lemma 8. Optimal decision in the absence of a subsidy under the RS game is as follows:
wNr =
(a+cm)N1λ2+(YZ+cm M2)κ
2∆4r
; pNr =
2aN1λ2+(aM1+YZ+2cmλ2)κ
2∆4r
; θNr =
(a−cm)Zκ
2∆4r
; τNr =
(a−cm)Xλ2
2∆4r
; πNmr =
(a−cm)2κλ2
4∆4r
; πNrr =
(a−cm)2κλ2
2∆24m
; QNr =
(a−cm)κλ2
∆4r
, where ∆4r = N2λ2 − κZ2.
Unlike optimal decisions in Policy C, the outcomes differ between the MS and RS game in the
absence of a subsidy. In this regards, one can conclude that government can weaken the effect of power
of CLSc members by implementing Policy C. We use results of above two lemmas as the benchmark to
compare outcomes.
4. Analysis and Discussions
In the previous section, results were compared to highlight the behavior of optimal decisions
between the two games. In the following subsections, we evaluate gains and losses in the perspective
of consumer, CLSC members, and the government organization.
4.1. Consumer’s Perspective
The following theorem highlights consumers preference among three subsidy policies.
Theorem 4. Irrespective of game structures, the greening level and sales volume are higher in Policy C.
We refer to Appendix F for the details of Theorem 4. Theorem 4 demonstrates that consumers
always receive product at a higher GL in Policy C, where the government can penetrate consumers
directly. Therefore, direct monetary gains stimulate consumers to buy more product. If sales volumes
increase, the manufacturer can compensate investment cost, and GL is also consequently increased.
Recall that GL, collection rate, and retail price are identical under both games in Policy C. Therefore,
Policy C outperforms others in the perspective of consumer benefit and green product consumption.
Graphical representation of GLs, sales volumes, effective prices consumer needs to pay, and ratios of
GLs with effective retail price in six scenarios is presented in Figure 1a–d. Parameter values are used
for numerical examples as follows: a = 500, β = 0.6, cm = 50($/unit), cr = 20($/unit), α = 10($/unit),
δ = 0.7, κ = 1500, λ1 = 0.3, and λ2 = 1. Note that technical restrictions on parameters values are
considered to ensure optimal conditions.
Figure 1a,b justify the statement of Theorem 4. The effective retail price is less in Policy C
compared to others, and GL is always higher in the RS game in all three policies. If the consumer
perceives the retail price in their mind, then Policy C outperforms others because the ratio of GLs with
retail price is maximum under Policy C. By comparing the ratios, consumers can figure out how much
they need to pay to procure the product. Figure 1c. demonstrates that the consumer needs to pay a
lesser price under Policy C. One can observe that the GLs are lower in Policy RE compared to others,
and the consumer needs to pay a higher price in Policy T.
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of (a) greening levels, (b) sales volumes, (c) effective retail prices,
and (d) ratio of greening levels with effective retail prices in Scenarios MC, RC, MRE, RRE, MT, and RT.
4.2. Retailer and Manufacturer Perspectives
The following theorem is proposed to highlight the pros and cons for three policies in the
perspective of CLSC members.
Theorem 5. Under both games, the collection rate of used product and profits for each member are always
higher in Policy C.
We refer to Appendix G for the details of Theorem 5. The outcomes of Theorem 5 are consistent
with Theorem 4. GL and sales volume are both higher in Policy C; consequently, CLSC members receive
a higher profit in a green-sensitive market. Flexibility of investment for the manufacturer in improving
GL and used product return is increased with market demand. In such a scenario, the retailer can
also get benefited. The results demonstrate that fact. Graphical representation of the profits for the
retailer and manufacturer, collection rate, total investment for the manufacturer to produce product
(MI) (MICi = λ1θ
C
i D
C
i + λ2θ
C
i
2; MIREi = λ1θ
R
i ED
RE
i + λ2θ
RE
i
2; and MITi = λ1θ
T
i D
T
i + (1− µTi )λ2θTi
2),
investment for the manufacturer in encouraging used product return (RI) (RICi = ατ
C
i D
C
i + κτ
C
i
2;
RIREi = ατ
RE
i D
RE
i + (1− ηREi )κτREi
2; and RITi = ατ
T
i D
T
i + κτ
T
i
2), ratios of relative change of GL with
investment to produce products (∆θMji =
θ
j
i−θ
N
i
MI ji−MI
N
i
), and ratios of relative change of the collection
rate with the investment effort to stimulate used product return (4τRji =
τ
j
i−τ
N
i
RI ji−RI
N
i
) in six scenarios is
presented in Figure 2a–g.
Figure 2a–g support the statement of Theorem 5. In Policy RE, the manufacturer receives a
subsidy to encourage the product collection, but it does not yield a higher return compared to Policy
C. Note that the used product collection rates are less in Policy T compared to other two. Figure 2e
demonstrates that the investment effort to stimulate used product return for the manufacturer is
less in Policy RE; however, due to the government support, collection rate improved. In Policy T,
the manufacturer has more flexibility in the R&D investment until the manufacturer can invest more in
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 145 12 of 23
Policy C. However, Figure 2f exhibits some doubts about the efficiency of Policy C. In Policy C, the total
amount of investment for the manufacturer to improve GL is maximum, but the ratio of relative change
in GL improvement is less. Therefore, higher investment does not ensure higher GL, especially in
Policy C. Figure 2g demonstrates a noteworthy outcome in the perspective of designing subsidy policy.
It demonstrates that the power of CLSC members should be considered before implementation of
the subsidy policy. Interestingly, the manufacturer reduces the investment effort considerably under
the RS game, but a reverse trend is observed under the MS game. Overall, investment efficiency in
producing greener product and used product return reduced in Policy C.
Figure 2. Graphical representation of (a) profit of manufacturer, (b) profit of retailer, (c) used product
return, (d) manufacturer’s R&D investment to produce product, (e) investment effort in encouraging
used product collection, (f) ratios of relative change of greening levels with investment to produce
greener product, and (g) ratios of relative change of return rate with investment effort to stimulate
product return for the manufacturer in Scenarios MC, RC, MRE, RRE, MT, and RT.
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4.3. Government Perspective
In this subsection, we compare SWs and the amount of government subsidy to explore
consequence in the perspective of government organizations.
Theorem 6. The social welfare and the amount of government subsidy is higher in Policy C in both the games.
We refer Appendix H for the proof of Theorem 6. Theorem 6 demonstrates that the government
expenditure and SW are always higher in Policy C. Therefore, the outcomes of Theorem 4–6
are very much alike. Higher subsidy cause higher profits, as well as GL, and SW consequently
increased. Graphical representation of SW, the amount of government subsidy (GI) (GICi = ρ
C
i D
C
i ;
GIREi = η
RE
i κτ
RE
i
2; and GITi = µ
T
i λ2θ
T
i
2), and the ratios of relative change of GL with total amount of
government subsidy (∆θGji =
θ
j
i−θ
N
i
GI ji
) in six scenarios is depicted in Figure 3a–c.
Figure 3. Graphical representation of (a) social welfare, (b) total amount of government subsidy in
each scenario, and (c) ratios of relative change of greening levels with total amount of government
subsidy in Scenarios MC, RC, MRE, RRE, MT, and RT.
The above figures support the statement of Theorem 6. However, if we investigate at the macro
level, then one cannot draw a straightforward conclusion in favor of Policy C. By correlating Figure 2e
with Figure 3c, the ratio of investment efficiency reflects the different consequence. In the perspective
of the manufacturer and government organization, Policy C may lead to an inadequate investment
decision. However, one cannot ignore the influence of consumers until they enjoy the higher privilege
in Policy C because government support directly passes to the consumer. The total amount of
expenditure for the government is too high in Policy C, which does not yield a higher relative
improvement in GL.
4.4. When Manufacturer Produces Only DIGPs
In this study, it is assumed that the manufacturer produces MDIGPs but does not recover the cost
for used product. Therefore, we conduct numerical experiment where the manufacturer produces
DIGPs(λ1 = 0), which is more predominant in existing literature. The following figures represent
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the relative change of profits of the SC members (∆π jki =
π
j
ki |λ1=0−π
j
ki
π
j
ki
, k = m, r); collection rates
(∆τ ji =
τ
j
i |λ1=0−τ
j
i
τ
j
i
); GLs (∆θ ji =
θ
j
i |λ1=0−θ
j
i
θ
j
i
); total amount of government subsidies (∆GI ji =
GI ji |λ1=0−GI
j
i
GI ji
);
and SWs (∆π jgi =
π
j
gi |λ1=0−π
j
gi
π
j
gi
).
It is expected that the CLSC members receive higher profits if unit production cost decreased.
Figure 4a,b reflect that nature changes profits for CLSC members, SW, and GL, which also supports the
expectation. CLSC members always receive a higher profit in Policy C, and GL is always maximum.
However, the nature of used product collection and the amount of government subsidy changes
significantly. Increment in the used the product collection rate and the amount of government subsidy
are maximum in the RS game and in Policy T. Therefore, the government needs to examine the product
type to frame an effective policy.
Figure 4. Graphical representation of (a) change in profits for the manufacturer, (b) change in profits
for the retailer, (c) change in product collection rates, (d) change in greening levels (λ1 = 0), (e) change
in amount of government subsidies, and (f) change in social welfare in Scenarios MC, RC, MRE, RRE,
MT, and RT (λ1 = 0).
4.5. Overall Implications
The preceding discussion offers a rich amount of contextual detail based on the analytical and
numerical evaluation. Subsidies make sense to encourage R&D activities in areas that would benefit
society, stimulate greener product consumption with a society’s environmental objectives, such as
less contamination, cleaner air, etc., provide much-needed help to innovative startups, or support a
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manufacturer in surviving financial losses due to high R&D investment. However, there has been little
discussion on comparative analysis among outcomes under the government SW optimization goal.
The present study discloses some eye opening issues. It has always been a topic of interest
to consider which subsidy policy can lead to a pragmatic CLSC business model, or which is both
environmentally and economically worthwhile for participating member and government organization.
Based on the discussion, one can articulate that the optimal decision, preference, and implications of
subsidy policies significantly change between MS and RS games. To maintain goodwill and dominate
a green-sensitive market, it is always imperative for the retailer to sell greener product. However,
the manufacturer receives a higher subsidy in the MS game; yet, GL and SW is higher in the RS game.
Therefore, the power of a CLSC member adds a degree of conflict, and government organizations
needs figure out the dynamics of power before implementing subsidy policies. Overall, Policy C
under the RS game can drive toward encouraging outcomes in the perspective of consumers, retailer,
and government organization.
It is commonly believed that a subsidy assists manufactures to produce greener products and
trade them at low price to the consumers. To some extent, the results of the present study support
the convention, but in the presence of government subsidy policy, CLSC members need to be
prepared for sudden operational changes. In practice, government organizations sometimes commit to
environmental policies for several years but afterward renege on their commitments. For example,
the government of China recently recommended to withdraw a subsidy from the EV battery industry
(https://chinaeconomicreview.com/subsidy-withdrawal-to-decimate-chinas-ev-industry/), and the
government of India recently revised the amount of subsidy for the scheme “Faster Adoption and
Manufacturing of Hybrid and Electric Vehicles” (https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/power/govt-withdraws-sops-to-conventional-battery-vehicles-under-fame/65990495). If the
government suddenly revises a subsidy amount due to a sudden fall of market demand,
the manufacturer needs to adjust its production rate and to be prepared for adjustment of the
entire operations and marketing activities. For example, when the Indian government revised the
scheme and reduced the direct subsidy to consumers, car manufacturers faced market fall. A similar
situation also reported in the UK is that “Subsidy cuts blamed for fall in UK sales of electrified
vehicles" (www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/04/subsidy-cuts-blamed-for-fall-in-uk-sales-
of-electrified-vehicles). Examples are similar with Policy C because, in the car industry, consumers
directly receive a subsidy from government. Results indicate that Policy C clearly becomes a financial
liability for government. Due to direct cash-transfer in Policy C, all the consumers enjoy a subsidy
irrespective of income groups. Therefore, there is a possibility that government resources might
become a drain, especially if high-income consumers take the subsidy. As observed earlier, GL and GIs
are maximum in Policy C; therefore, this is where to find answer of the question how much additional
amount needs to be paid for improving GL? Figure 5a,b, representing the ratio of GLs and GIs under
Policy C, are drawn to obtain an overview in this direction.
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Figure 5. (a) Ratio greening levels in different subsidy policies. (b) Ratios of amount of government
subsidy in Policy C and RE. (c) Ratios of amount of government subsidy in Policy T and RE.
By observing the vertical axis of Figure 5a–c, one can recognize the additional financial burden
associated with Policy C, especially under the MS game. It is also found that in Policy RE,
the government needs to spend less and consequently also lessen GL. In practice, there is a possibility
that the manufacturer can strategically reduce investment effort in presence of a subsidy. Our study
also supports this fact because the manufacturer clearly reduce its investment effort, as depicted in
Figure 2g. Figure 2g also demonstrates that if the intention of the government is to improve used
product collection, then Policy T or RE under the MS game can drive to the desirable outcome. Finally,
in Policy T, the government provides a subsidy and anticipates that the manufacturer can produce
greener product, while consumers benefit from low prices. However, Policy T also becomes pricier in
the perspective of consumers, but the improvement of GL is maximum under this policy.
5. Conclusions
The formation of a sustainable CLSC in the presence of a government subsidy is one of the key
issues because it does not make sense to pollute the world for higher profits. One the other hand,
it is infeasible in the perspective of a government organization to spend large amounts that fail to
create value. Therefore, it is always challenging to design a subsidy policy that can lead to pragmatic
outcomes. In literature, comparative studies on optimal outcomes in the presence of government SW
optimization goal are scanty.
Motivated by emerging practice, we formulated eight CLSC models to compare outcomes of three
subsidy policies. The central result emerging from the analysis reveals that in Policy C, CLSC members
receive higher profits, SW of the government organization higher, and the consumers receive products
at a higher GL. Characteristics of the optimal decision under the MS and RS games are not concurrent;
GL and used product collection are always higher in the RS game, and the government subsidy rate
is always higher in the MS game. Whatever the nature of game structures, the consumer always
receives product at lower price in Policy C. However, Policy C still has shortcomings. GL does
improve as the R&D investment or amount of the government subsidy increases, but the rate of
change is lowest. It is found that Policy C can be a substantial financial burden without too much
improvement in GL and used product collection. Because the amount of the subsidy is maximum in
Policy C, our study contradicts conventional beliefs that a higher subsidy level always improves the
performance of the CLSC members. The present study discloses that any straightforward conclusion on
the optimal preferences in the perspective of CLSC members, consumers, and government organization
is challenging to be made. If the government wants to improve green product consumption among its
community, then the government can implement Policy C. However, expenditure as a subsidy will
increase considerably. If the government aims to utilize a subsidy expenditure in an effective way,
then Policy T can lead to a decent outcome. However, SW will be less and the consumer needs to
pay more. In Policy RE, a strategic manufacturer can reduce the investment effort in the presence of a
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subsidy. If the intention of government is to improve used product collection, then Policy T or RE under
the MS game can drive to a desirable outcome. It is also observed that the manufacturer’s decision
to produce DIGPs or MDGIPs can also affect the outcomes of a subsidy policy. A retailer-dominated
CLSC is always advantageous for the government; in that scenario, the government can reduce the
amount of a subsidy, maximize SW, and the consumer receives greener products.
Therefore, this study can be extended in several directions. In practice, a retailer or third party is
also involved in used product collection. Sometimes manufacturer and retailer can both be involved
in collections. Therefore, one can examine optimal decisions in the different modes of collections
i.e., manufacturer, retailer, third party, or their combined collection mode. We assume that the
consumer cannot distinguish the difference between the new and re-manufactured products. However,
consumers often value the re-manufactured product less than the new product [69]. Therefore, one can
analyze the influence of subsidy policies where the CLSC members need to set different prices for new
and re-manufactured product. We restricted our analysis under single period formulation; therefore,
one can extend this analysis under two-period setting. Furthermore, it will be interesting to examine the
behavior of a CLSC decision if the members agree to cooperate with each other through coordination
contract mechanisms [70,71] under the influence of the government subsidy.
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Appendix A. Optimal Decision in Scenario MC
To obtain optimal response for the retailer in Equation (1), one needs to solve dπ
C
rm
dpCm
= 0.
On simplification, pCm(wCm, θCm, τCm , ρCm) =
a+wCm+θCm β+ρCm
2 . Because
d2πCrm
dpCm
2 = −2 < 0, the profit function
for the retailer is concave.
Therefore, substituting pCm in Equation (2), the profit function for the manufacturer is obtained as:
πCmm(w
C
m, θ
C
m, τ
C
m , ρ
C
m) =
(wCm − θCmλ1 + XτCm − cm)(a− wCm + βθCm + ρCm)− 2κτCm
2 − 2λ2θCm
2
2
To obtain optimal response for the manufacturer on wholesale price and investment efforts,
we need to solve dπ
C
mm
dwCm
= 0, dπ
C
mm
dτCm
= 0, and dπ
C
mm
dθCm
= 0, simultaneously. After simplification,
the following response is obtained:
wmC =
κ(a + cm + ρCm)(4λ2 − β(β− λ1)) + (κ(β2 − λ21)− X2λ2)(a + ρCm)
κ(8λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2
τCm =
(a− cm + ρCm)Xλ2
κ(8λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2
and θCm =
κZ(a− cm + ρCm)
κ(8λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2
Because, the manufacturer’s profit function is a function of three variables, we compute the
Hessian matrix(HCm) to verify concavity as follows:
HCm =

∂2πCmm
∂wCm
2
∂2πCmm
∂wCm∂τCm
∂2πCmm
∂wCm∂θCm
∂2πCmm
∂wCm∂τCm
∂2πCmm
∂τCm
2
∂2πCmm
∂τCm ∂θ
C
m
∂2πCmm
∂wCm∂θCm
∂2πCmm
∂τCm ∂θ
C
m
∂2πCmm
∂θCm
2
 =
 −1 −X2
β+λ1
2
−X
2 −2κ
βX
2
β+λ1
2
βX
2 −2λ2 − λ1β

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The values of first, second, and third principal minors are obtained as HCm1 = −1 < 0; HCm2 =
8κ−X2
4 ; and H
C
m3 = −
(8κ−X2)λ2−κ(β−λ1)2
2 , respectively. Therefore, profit function for the manufacturer is
concave if 8κ > X2 and (8κ − X2)λ2 − κ(β− λ1)2 > 0.
Substituting optimal responses in Equation (3), the SW function for the government organization
is obtained as πCgm(ρCm) =
κλ2(a−cm+ρCm)((a−cm)((14κ−X2)λ2−κZ2)+κZ2ρCm−(2κ−X2)λ2ρCm)
((8κ−X2)λ2−κ(β−λ1)2)2
. Therefore, one can
obtain optimal subsidy rate by solving
dπCgr
dρCm
= 0. On Simplification, optimal subsidy rate is obtained as
ρCm =
6(a−cm)κλ2
κ(2λ2−Z2)−X2λ2
. Note that d
2πCrm
dρCm
2 = − 2κλ2∆1(κ(8λ2−(β−λ1)2)−X2λ2)2 < 0, i.e., π
C
gm is concave with respect
to subsidy rate if ∆1 = κ(2λ2 − (β− λ1)2)− X2λ2. By using back substitution, we obtain optimal
decision as presented in Lemma 1.
The following additional notations are used throughout the article for simplicity:
M1 = 2λ2 − Z2, M2 = 4λ2 − Z2, M3 = 8λ2 − Z2, M4 = 14λ2 − Z2, N1 = 2κ − X2, N2 = 4κ − X2,
N3 = 6κ − X2, N4 = 8κ − X2, N5 = 14κ − X2, X = cmδ− cr − α, Y = aλ1 − cmβ, Z = β− λ1.
Appendix B. Optimal Decision in Scenario RC
First, we substitute mCr = pCr − wCr in Equation (1)–(3) to obtain optimal decision in the RS game.
To obtain the manufacturer response first, one needs to solve dπ
C
mr
dwCr
= 0, dπ
C
mr
dτCr
= 0, and dπ
C
mr
dθCr
= 0
simultaneously. Therefore, the manufacturer’s response is obtained as follows:
wCr =
(κ(2λ2 + Zλ1)− X2λ2)(a−mCr + ρCr ) + cmκ(2λ2 − β(β− λ1))
κ(4λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2
τ =
(a− cm −mCr + ρCr )Xλ2
κ(4λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2
andθ =
(a− cm −mCr + ρCr )κZ
κ(4λ2 − (β− λ1)2)− X2λ2
Because, the profit function for the manufacturer is a function of three variables, therefore,
we compute corresponding Hessian matrix(HCr ) for the manufacturer profit function is as follows:
HCr =

∂2πCmr
∂wCr
2
∂2πCmr
∂wCr ∂τCr
∂2πCmr
∂wCr ∂θCr
∂2πCmr
∂wCr ∂τCr
∂2πCmr
∂τCr
2
∂2πCmr
∂τCr ∂θ
C
r
∂2πCmr
∂wCr ∂θCr
∂2πCmr
∂τCr ∂θ
C
r
∂2πCmr
∂θCr
2
 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2 −X β + λ1
−X −2κ βX
β + λ1 βX −2(λ2 + βλ1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The principal minors of above Hessian matrix are HCr1 = −2 < 0; HTr2 = 4κ − X2 > 0; and HTr3 =
−2(κ(4λ2 + Z2)− X2λ2), respectively. Consequently, the profit function will be concave if 4κ > X2
and κ(4λ2 + Z2) > X2λ2.
Substituting optimal response for the manufacturer in Equation (1), profit function for the retailer
is obtained as πCrr(mCr ) =
2mCr κλ2(a−cm−mCr +ρCr )
κ(4λ2−Z2)−X2λ2
. Therefore, the optimal response for the retailer is
obtained by solving dπ
C
rr
dmCr
= 0. After simplification, mCr =
a−cm+ρCr
2 . The profit function of the retailer
is also concave because d
2πCrr
dmCr
2 =
−4κλ2
κ(4λ2−Z2)−X2λ2
. Substituting optimal responses in Equation (3),
the simplified value of the SW in Scenario RC is obtained as follows:
πCgr(ρ
C
r ) =
κλ2(a− cm + ρCr )((a− cm)(14κλ2 − 3κZ2 − 3X2λ2) + κZ2ρCr − (2κ − X2)λ2ρCr )
4(κ(4λ2 − Z2)− X2λ2)2
Therefore, the optimal subsidy rate will be obtained by solving
dπCgr
dρCr
= 0. On simplification,
we obtain the value of ρCr as presented in Proposition (2). The SW under the RS game is concave
because, d
2πCrm
dρCr
2 = − κλ2∆12(κ(4λ2−(β−λ1)2)−X2λ2)2 < 0 where ∆1 = κ(2λ2 − (β− λ1)
2)− X2λ2. By using back
substitution, we obtain optimal decision as presented in Lemma 2.
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1
The following inequalities ensure the proof of first part of Theorem 1:
θCm − θCr = 0; τCm − τCr = 0; πCgm − πCgr = 0; ρC0m − ρC0r =
(a−cm)(κZ2+X2λ2)
∆1
> 0;
Differentiating optimal decisions in Lemma 1,2, with respect to λ1 and λ2, the following relations
are obtained:
dτCm
dλ1
= dτ
C
r
dλ1
= (a−cm)XZκλ2
∆12
< 0; dτ
C
m
dλ2
= dτ
C
r
dλ2
= −(a−cm)XZ
2κ
∆12
< 0; dθ
C
m
dλ1
= dθ
C
r
dλ1
= −(a−cm)κ(2Z
2κ+∆1)
∆12
< 0;
dθCm
dλ2
= dθ
C
r
dλ2
= −(a−cm)N1Zκ
∆12
< 0;
dπCgm
dλ1
=
dπCgr
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)
2Zκ2λ2
∆12
< 0;
dπCgm
dλ2
=
dπCgr
dλ2
= −(a−cm)
2Z2κ2
∆12
< 0;
dρCm
dλ1
= −12(a−cm)
2Zκ2λ2
∆12
< 0; dρ
C
m
dλ2
= −6(a−cm)
2Z2κ2
∆12
< 0; dρ
C
r
dλ1
= −8(a−cm)
2Zκ2λ2
∆12
< 0; dρ
C
r
dλ2
= −4(a−cm)
2Z2κ2
∆12
<
0. The above inequalities supports the claim in Theorem 1.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 2
The following inequalities ensure the proof of first part of Theorem 2:
θREr − θREm =
(a−cm)(Z2(X4+16N1κ)λ22+Z4κ(Z2κ−2N3λ2)+2X2λ22(5M1κ+7N3λ2))
2∆2m∆2r
> 0;
τREr − τREm =
(a−cm)Xλ22(24M2κλ2+M3Z2κ+M4X2λ2)
∆2m∆2r
> 0; ηREr − ηREm =
2(6N1−X2)λ22−N4Z2λ2+κZ4
2κ(5λ2−Z2)(14λ2−Z2)
> 0;
πREgr − πREgm =
(a−cm)2λ2(2X2(102κ−7X2)λ32+(96κ
2−40X2κ+X4)Z2λ22−2(13κ−X2)κZ4λ2+κ2Z6)
4∆2m∆2r
> 0.
Differentiating optimal decisions in Lemma 3,4, with respect to λ1 and λ2, the following relations
are obtained:
dτREm
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)(M4+6λ2)M3XZκλ2
∆2m2
< 0; dτ
RE
m
dλ2
= −(a−cm)κXZ
2(48λ22+28M2λ2+Z4)
∆2m2
< 0;
dθREm
dλ1
= −(a−cm)κ(2(M4+6λ2)Z
2 M32κ+(2(17M1+22λ2)λ2+Z4)∆2m)
M4∆2m2
< 0;
dθREm
dλ2
= −(a−cm)κZ(M4X
2Z2+2M3(4M2κ+7N1λ2+2κλ2))
M4∆2m2
< 0;
dπREgm
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)
2κ2Zλ2
∆2m2
< 0;
dπREgm
dλ2
= −(a−cm)
2Z2κ2(48λ22+28M2λ2+Z4)
∆2m2
< 0; dτ
RE
r
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)XZλ2((4κ+X
2)λ2
2+10M1κλ2+κZ4)
∆2r2
< 0;
dτREr
dλ2
= −(a−cm)XZ
2((4κ+X2)λ22+M1κλ2+κZ4)
∆2r2
< 0; dθ
RE
r
dλ2
= −(a−cm)Z(2κ∆2r+X
2(M2Z2κ+(3N1+2κ)λ22))
2∆2r2
< 0;
dθREr
dλ1
=
−(a−cm)(N1λ22(16κλ2+X2(Z2+λ2))+4(κ2−X4)λ32+N3X
2λ32+4κ
2λ22(7λ2−4Z2)+Z2κ(Z4κ−4Z2κλ2+4X2λ2(M2+λ2)))
2∆2r2
<
0;
dπREgr
dλ1
= −(a−cm)
2Z2(3M1κ+N2λ2)(M1κ+X2λ2)
∆2r2
< 0;
dπREgr
dλ2
= −(a−cm)
2Zλ2(3M1κ+N2λ2)(M1κ+X2λ2)
∆2r2
< 0.
The above inequalities supports the claim in Theorem 2.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 3
The following inequalities ensure the proof of first part of Theorem 3:
θTr − θTm =
(a−cm)Zκ2(N5Z2κ+(2(X2+4κ)N2+N42)λ2)
∆3m∆3r
> 0; µTr − µTm =
N22λ2+κ(8κλ2−Z2 N5)
2(N2+κ)N5λ2
> 0
τTr − τTm =
(a−cm)X(N5Z2κ(M2κ+2N1λ2)+N2λ2(2κ(25M1κ−2X2 M2+(7N1−2X2)λ2)+3X4λ2))
2∆3m∆3r
> 0;
πTgr − πTgm =
(a−cm)2κ(X6λ22+X2κ2(Z4+44λ22)+2Z2κ(N4(N4+4κ)λ2+(M3−6Z2)κ2))
4∆3m∆3r
> 0.
Differentiating optimal decisions in Propositions 5 and 6, with respect to λ1 and λ2, the following
relations are obtained:
dτTm
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)N4 N5XZκλ2
∆3m2
< 0; dτ
T
m
dλ2
= −(a−cm)N4 N5XZ
2κ
∆3m2
< 0; dθ
T
m
dλ1
= −(a−cm)N2κ(2N2Z
2κ+∆3m)
∆3m2
< 0;
dθTm
dλ2
= −(a−cm)N4
2 N5Zκ
∆3m2
< 0;
dπTgm
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)
2 N52Zκ2λ2
∆3m2
< 0;
dπTgm
dλ2
= −(a−cm)
2 N52Z2κ2
∆3m2
< 0;
dτTr
dλ1
= 2(a−cm)Xκ(2κ
2+9N1κ+X4)Zλ2
∆3r2
< 0; dτ
T
r
dλ2
= −(a−cm)(N2+κ)N2Z
2Xκ
∆3r2
< 0;
dθTr
dλ1
= −(a−cm)κ(N2
2λ2+N3Z2κ)(N2+κ)
∆3r2
< 0; dθ
T
r
dλ2
= −(a−cm)(N2+κ)N2
2Zκ
∆3r2
< 0;
dπTgr
dλ1
= −2(a−cm)
2(N2+κ)2Zκ2λ2
∆3r2
< 0;
dπTgr
dλ2
= −(a−cm)
2(N2+κ)2Z2κ2
∆3r2
< 0. The above inequalities supports the
claim in Theorem 3.
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Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 4
Differences among GLs under the MS game are found as follows:
θCm − θREm =
6(a−cm)Zκλ2(6κλ2+∆1)
∆1∆2m
> 0; θCm − θTm =
36(a−cm)κ3Zλ2
∆1∆3m
> 0.
Similarly, differences among GLs under the RS game are found as follows:
θCr − θREr =
(a−cm)Z(4κλ2+∆1)(2κλ2+∆1)
2∆1∆2r
> 0; θCr − θTr =
(a−cm)κ2Z(4κλ2+∆1)
∆1∆3r
> 0.
Differences among sales volumes under the MS game are found as follows:
QCm −QREm =
12(a−cm)κλ22(6κλ2+∆1)
2∆1∆2m
> 0; QCm −QTm =
12(a−cm)κ2λ2(6κλ2+∆1)
2∆1∆2m
> 0.
Differences among sales volumes under the RS game are found as follows:
QCr −QREr =
(a−cm)λ2(4κ−λ2+∆1)(2κ−λ2+∆1)
∆1∆2r
> 0; QCr −QTr =
(a−cm)κ(4κ−λ2+∆1)(2κ−λ2+∆1)
∆1∆3r
> 0.
The above relations ensure the claim in Theorem 4.
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 5
The profit differences for the manufacturer in three subsidy policies are obtained as follows:
πCmm − πREmm =
6(a−cm)2κλ22(2M4κ∆1+λ2∆3m)
∆12∆2m
> 0; πCmm − πTmm =
6(a−cm)2κ2λ2(6κλ2+∆1)∆1+λ2∆3m)
∆12∆3m
> 0;
πCmr − πREmr =
(a−cm)2λ2(4κλ2+∆1)(3Z4κ2+(18κN1+X4)λ22+2κλ2(M1κ−2Z2(N2+κ)))
4∆12∆2r
> 0;
πCmr − πTmr =
(a−cm)2κ(4κλ2+∆1)(∆12+2∆1(N3+κ)λ2+8κ2λ22)
4∆12∆3r
> 0.
Similarly, the profit differences for the retailer in three subsidy policies are obtained as follows:
πCrm − πRErm =
48(a−cm)2κ2λ23(∆1+6κλ2)(M12κ+λ2(11∆1+Z2(X2+2κ)+14κλ2))
∆12∆2m2
> 0;
πCrm − πTrm =
48(a−cm)2κ3λ22(N42λ2((κ+X2)λ2+2∆1)+(N4+3κ)κ2Z2
∆12∆3m2
> 0;
πCrr − πRErr =
(a−cm)2λ2(∆1+4κλ2)(∆12−2Z2κ∆1+2∆1(N3+X2+κ)λ2+8κ2λ22)
∆12∆2r
> 0;
πCrr − πTrr =
(a−cm)2κ(4κλ2+∆1)(∆12+2∆1(N3+κ)λ2+8κ2λ22)
2∆12∆3r
> 0;
Finally, the differences among used product return rates are obtained as follows:
τCm − τREm =
36(a−cm)Xκλ23
∆1∆2m
> 0; τCm − τTm =
6(a−cm)Xκλ2(6κλ2+∆1)
∆1∆3m
> 0;
τCr − τREr =
(a−cm)Xλ22(4κλ2+∆1)
∆1∆2r
> 0; τCr − τTr =
(a−cm)X(4κλ2+∆1)
2∆1∆3r
> 0.
Therefore, the theorem is proved.
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 6
The differences among SWs measures in the MS and RS games are computed as follows:
πCgm − πREgm =
36(a−cm)2κ2λ23
∆1∆2m
> 0; πCgm − πTgm =
36(a−cm)κ3λ22
∆1∆3m
> 0;
πCgr − πREgr =
(a−cm)2λ2(2κλ2+∆1)2
4∆1∆2r
> 0; πCgr − πTgr =
(a−cm)2κ(4κλ2+∆1)2
4∆1∆3r
> 0.
Similarly, the differences among total amount of subsidies in the MS and RS games are computed as
follows:
GICm − GIREm =
6(a−cm)2κλ22(2κ∆2m
2−M4X2λ2∆12)
∆12∆2m2
> 0; GICm − GITm =
6(a−cm)2κ2λ2(2λ2∆3m2−N5Z2κ∆12)
∆12∆3m2
> 0;
GICr − GIREr =
(a−cm)2λ2(N3λ2−Z2κ)(4κ∆2r2−(M2+λ2)X2λ2∆12)
∆12∆2r2
> 0; GICr − GITr =
(a−cm)2κ(N3λ2−Z2κ)(4λ2∆3r2−(N2+κ)Z2κ∆12)
∆12∆3r2
> 0
Therefore, the theorem is proved.
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